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Litigating a
Fair Housing Case
in the 90s
Edward G. Kramer
Kenneth J. Kowalski
Ensuring equal access to housing for
all Americans is closer to reality with
the passage of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act.
R ECENT STATUTORY AMEND- seq. ("Act') will be the impetus for
MENTS to the Federal Fair Hous- substantial litigation in this decade.
ing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et The Fair Housing Amendments Act
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of 1988 ("Amendments"), which was
enacted on September 13, 1988, and
became effective on March 12, 1989:
Established new protected classes;
* Created an administrative law
judge system to enforce the law; and
e Strengthened many of the original
provisions of the Act.
The addition of new protected classes
increases the already substantial need
for attorneys experienced in litigating
housing discrimination cases.
Many of the litigation strategies
used before the Amendments remain
sound today. See Kramer and Ko-
walski, An Overview of Fair Housing
Litigation (Part 2), 3 The Practical
Real Estate Lawyer 77 (March 1987).
This article will review the Amend-
ments, their impact on litigating a fair
housing case, and recent case law in
the area.
An important source for the most
recent judicial decisions and adminis-
trative interpretations is Prentice
Hall's Fair Housing-Fair Lending Re-
porter. A monthly bulletin reviewing
federal, state and local cases and re-
lated matters on fair housing is essen-
tial to keep the litigator on the cutting
edge of this subject.
A REVIEW OF TIE AMENDMENTS
The Amendments broadened
the prohibitions against discrimina-
tory financing by using the term "resi-
dential, real estate-related transac-
MAY
tion." The statute defines the term
"residential, real estate-related trans-
action" to mean any of the following:
"(1) The making or purchasing of
loans or providing other financial as-
sistance -
(A) for purchasing, constructing,
improving, repairing, or maintain-
ing a dwelling; or
(B) secured by residential real es-
tate.
(2) The selling, brokering, or apprais-
ing of residential real property."
§3605(b). (All section references are
to 42 U.S.C. unless otherwise indi-
cated.)
Further, Congress required the Sec-
retary of the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") to report annually on the
nature and extent of progress in elimi-
nating discriminatory housing prac-
tices. §3608(e).
The Amendments also expanded
the definition of "discriminatory
housing practice" to include coercion,
intimidation, threats, or interference
related to a person's exercise of fair
housing rights. The change in this def-
inition is important in that it elimi-
nates any question that individuals
may file private lawsuits based on sec-
tion 3617. There were some court de-
cisions that questioned whether a pri-
vate right existed. The three most
important Amendments, however, re-
late to:
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* The changes in the enforcement of
the law;
o Prohibitions of discrimination
against the handicapped; and
* Prohibitions of familial status dis-
crimination.
Amendments
Strengthen Enforcement
The Act created three methods for
its enforcement. The Amendments
established a new administrative pro-
cedure to assist in resolving housing
discrimination complaints. Now, the
Secretary ("Secretary") of HUD or the
aggrieved party may file a complaint
within one year of the alleged discrim-
ination. §3610(a).
Administrative Procedure
Under this statutory scheme HUD
has 100 days to conduct an initial in-
vestigation. The Secretary can issue
subpoenas and pay witness fees.
§3611 (b). If a party refuses to appear
at the administrative hearing the law
imposes a one-year imprisonment
and up to a $100,000 fine. §3611(c).
During this initial 100 days HUD may
commence conciliation to settle the
dispute. The Secretary must either
dismiss the complaint or file a charge
if the case is not settled through the
conciliation process. §3610(g).
A complainant, respondent, or
other aggrieved party may elect to
have the matter determined in federal
court by notifying HUD within 20
days of the issuing of the charge.
§3612(a). If a private lawsuit to en-
force rights protected by this section is
not filed, the matter will be decided
by an administrative law judge. The
hearing must commence within 120
days of the issuance of the charge. 42
U.S.C. §3612(b), (g)(1).
In December 1989 the first decision
by a HUD administrative law judge
was rendered under this new enforce-
ment scheme. The victim of discrimi-
nation was awarded a total of $65,000.
The defendant had to pay an addi-
tional $10,000 civil penalty and sell the
house to the black couple at the origi-
nal contract price of $92,000. HUD v.
Blackwell, No. HUDALJ 04-89-0520-
1 (Heifetz ALJ 12-21-89); V Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Bulletin 1-3
(February 1990). The size of the award
and completeness of the relief granted
are sure to encourage more complain-
ants to use the administrative enforce-
ment avenue to obtain relief.
Private Lawsuit
Unlike the case of employment dis-
crimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, section
2000e et seq., victims of housing bias
may simply avoid the administrative
process by filing a lawsuit under sec-
tion 3613. One of the changes under
the amended statute is that a person
can bring a suit within two years of
the alleged discrimination rather than
the previous 180 days. See §3613(a)-
(1)(A).
The Supreme Court has held that
pre-Amendments section 3613 pro-
1990
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vided an independent remedy that
could be pursued at the same time
HUD was investigating a section 3610
complaint. Gladstone Realtors v. Vil-
lage of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109
(1979). It is not likely that this inter-
pretation will change under the
Amendments. Note, however, that
the limitations period is tolled while
HUD administrative proceedings are
pending. Tabrizi v. Village of Glen El-
lyn, 883 E2d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 1989).
Also, under the new law a private
lawsuit is barred if the case has al-
ready started before the administra-
tive law judge. See §3613(a)(3).
Lawsuit by Attorney General
The last method of enforcement is
the institution of litigation by the At-
torney General of the United States.
§3614. To file a lawsuit under the pre-
vious provisions the Justice Depart-
ment had to prove that a "pattern or
practice" of housing discrimination
was occurring that raised "an issue of
general public importance. . ..."
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co.,
Inc., 484 E2d 438,444 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). For
an excellent discussion on the legisla-
tive history of this phrase, see United
States v. Mitchell, 327 E Supp. 476,
480-83 (N.D. Georgia 1971).
Now the Attorney General can also
institute suit in non-pattern-and-
practice cases that are referred by
HUD. Under the amended provision
the Justice Department must bring an
action based on cases referred by
MAY
HUD within 18 months from the al-
leged discrimination. §3614(b)(1)(B).
Also, now the federal Government is
subject to a statute of limitations for
bringing this action. This was not the
case under the original statute. United
States v. Sommerlin, 310 U.S. 414
(1940); United States v. Mitchell, su-
pra, at 485.
The Justice Department filed its
first lawsuits under the Amendments
on March 13, 1989, the date the law
took effect. Both cases involved al-
leged practices of property owners or
managers that expressed limitations,
preferences, and other discriminatory
choices based on race. US. v. Klinker,
Case No. 4-89-CIV-210 (D.Minn filed
3-13-89); U.S. v. Rent America, Inc.,
Case No. 89-6188-CIV-Paine (S.D.
Fla. filed 3-13-89); IV Fair Housing-
Fair Lending Bulletin 4-5 (May 1989)
Handicapped Discrimination
The Act now defines a person with
disabilities as one who:
"(1) [has] a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life ac-
tivities,
(2) [has] a record of having such an
impairment, or
(3) [is] regarded as having such an im-
pairment,
but such term does not include cur-
rent, illegal use of or addiction to a
controlled substance...."§3602(h).
In its final rules to interpret "Imple-
mentation of the Fair Housing
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Amendments Act of 1988," 54 FR.
3232, 3245 (January 23, 1989), HUD
cited the legislative history as requir-
ing a liberal interpretation of the term
"handicap." This interpretation
would include individuals with the
AIDS virus or tuberculosis, alco-
holics, the mentally ill, and former
drug abusers. However, nothing in
the statute requires that a person rent
or sell property to a handicapped per-
son who would "constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other
individuals or whose tenancy would
result in substantial physical damage
to the property of others."
§3604(f)(9). See 24 C.ER. §100.201
(1989).
Reasonable Modification
The law does require that a handi-
capped person be able to rent if rea-
sonable modifications to the existing
dwelling would permit the individual
to reside there and he pays for the
modification. §3604(f)(3)(A). See
also 24 C.ER. §100.204 (1989). For
example, if a blind prospective tenant
could live in the rental property by
having a seeing eye dog, the apart-
ment's rule prohibiting pets cannot be
used to deny this handicapped person
the right to rent the unit.
Accessibility of
Mutifamily Dwellings
The Amendments also make it un-
lawful to make multifamily dwellings
inaccessible to persons with handi-
caps if they are to be occupied for the
first time after March 13, 1991.
§3604(f)(3)(C). The exact require-
ments necessary to meet this obliga-
tion have not yet been determined.
HUD has requested comments from
the public before adopting a substan-
tive regulation for this area.
Preemption
Note that the statute specifically
denies a federal preemption claim.
The law states that "[n]othing in this
subchapter shall be construed to in-
validate or limit any law of a State or
political subdivision of a State, or
other jurisdiction in which this title
shall be effective, that requires dwell-
ings to be designed and constructed in
a manner that affords handicapped
persons greater access than is required
by this title." §3604(f)(8).
Inquiring About Handicaps
Landlords or real estate agents are
limited in what they can ask about a
person's handicap. They cannot ask
about the nature or severity of a
handicap, nor inquire about whether
some person associated with the
buyer or potential tenant is handi-
capped. However, HUD has indi-
cated that the following inquiries can
be made as long as all applicants are
asked the same questions:
a Whether the applicant can meet the
requirements of ownership or ten-
ancy;
* Whether an applicant is qualified
for a dwelling available only to per-
1990
HeinOnline  -- 1 Prac. Litig. 45 1990
46 THE PRA CTICAL LITIGATOR
sons with handicaps or to persons
with a particular type of handicap;
* Whether an applicant for a dwell-
ing is qualified for a priority available
to persons with handicaps or to per-
sons with a particular type of handi-
cap;
* Whether an applicant for a dwell-
ing is a current illegal abuser or addict
of a controlled substance; and
* Whether an applicant has been
convicted of the illegal manufacture
or distribution of a controlled sub-
stance. 24 C.ER. §100.202(c) (1989).
Handicap Discrintn Litigation
To determine whether the evidence
of handicap discrimination makes a
prima facie case, you must apply the
standard of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973):
* The complainant is handicapped as
defined in the statute;
* The complainant was a qualified
prospective buyer or tenant;
o The complainant was denied the
rental unit or home; and
* When applicable, the unit was later
rented or sold to a non-handicapped
person. Quaker Hill Place v. State Hu-
man Relations Commission, 498 A.2d
175, 183 (Del. Super. 1985).
Effect on Zoning Ordinaces
The most significant effect of the
handicapped discrimination prohibi-
tion may well be on local zoning ordi-
nances. Although the Amendments
do not specifically prohibit zoning
laws that prevent handicapped hous-
ing, they do make it illegal to discrimi-
nate "in the sale or rental, or to other-
wise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter be-
cause of" the buyer's or renter's hand-
icapping condition, or "the handicap-
ping condition of any person
associated with the buyer or renter."
42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(1). Courts have in
the past determined that this language
applies to zoning regulations, and the
legislative history supports this inter-
pretation. U.S. Code Congressional
and Administrative News, No. 8,
p.2185 (November 1988).
The law has already been used suc-
cessfully to attack a city's refusal to is-
sue a special permit to allow the re-
modeling of an existing building to
house AIDS patients. The developer
was able to obtain injunctive relief or-
dering the community to take the nec-
essary action to permit the remodeling
of the facility. Baxter v. City of Belle-
ville, fi., 720 E Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill
1989). Also, the U.S. Department of
Justice has filed a lawsuit against a
community that had refused to permit
the construction of a group home for
15 mentally retarded adults based on
the amended Act. U.S. v. Chicago
Heights, Case No. 89 C 4938 (N.D. Ill.
filed 6-20-89); IV Fair Housing-Fair
Lending Bulletin 3-5 (August 1989)
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Familial Status Now Protected
The Amendments added protec-
tion against discrimination for fami-
lies with children, prohibiting dis-
crinination in the sale or rental of
housing because of "familial status."
This generally means the presence of
children under 18. §3607(k).
The Department of Justice has
filed several lawsuits alleging family-
status discrimination. The first case,
U.S. v. LaFonge Associates, Case No.
89-1729 (D.N.J. filed 4-18-89) was
settled for $33,000 within two months
of filing. IV Fair Housing-Fair Lend-
ing Bulletin 18 (August 1989) For a
more comprehensive review of both
the legislative history and possible le-
gal impact see Comment, The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988: A
Critical Analysis of "Familial Status;
54 Mo. L. Rev. 393 (1989).
"Housing for Older
Persons" Exempted
However, the Act provides an ex-
emption from this prohibition for
housing which qualifies as "housing
for older persons." §3607(b). The stat-
utory definition of "housing for older
persons" comprises three categories of
housing:
* Housing provided under any state
or federal program that is specifically
designed and operated to assist elderly
persons, as determined by the Secre-
tary of HUD;
9 Housing intended for, and solely
occupied by, persons 62 or older; and
e Housing intended for and occupied
by at least one person 55 years of age
or older per unit, provided certain cri-
teria, spelled out in 24 C.ER. Part
100.34 (1989) are met.
Simply labeling an apartment com-
plex or housing development as hous-
ing for senior citizens will not be
enough. To merit the exemption, the
housing will have to be either:
* Solely intended for, and occupied
by, persons over 62; or
* Intended and operated for occu-
pancy by at least one person over 55
per unit.
To meet the latter requirement, 80 per
cent of the units must have at least one
resident over 55. In addition the com-
plex must provide significant facilities
and services specifically designed to
meet the needs of older persons or
demonstrate that it is not practicable to
provide such services and demonstrate
that the housing facility is necessary to
provide important housing opportuni-
ties for older persons.
The legislative history of the
amendments indicates that these ex-
ceptions are to be narrowly con-
strued. 134 Cong. Rec. H6498 (daily
ed. August 8, 1988)
Housing that did not meet the re-
quirements for housing for older per-
sons as of the date of enactment of the
Amendments could still qualify as long
as new occupants of that housing meet
the age requirements. §3607(b)(3).
1990
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Restrictions on Number
of Occupants Exempted
The other significant exemption in-
volves restrictions on the number of
persons permitted to occupy a dwell-
ing unit. The Amendments do not
limit the applicability of any reason-
able local, state, or federal restrictions
regarding the maximum number of
occupants per dwelling unit.
§3607(b)(1). This provision is in-
tended to allow reasonable govern-
mental limitations on occupancy to
continue in effect as long as they are
applied to all occupants and do not
operate to discriminate on a prohib-
ited basis. See H.R. Report No. 711,
100th Congress, 2d Sess. 31 (1988).
This exemption will not automati-
cally save all zoning restrictions. For
instance, in Doe v. City of Butler, 892
E2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Cir-
cuit remanded for more thorough
consideration a claim that a city's six-
person limit on transitional housing
would adversely affect battered
women seeking shelter because the
limit would make it difficult for
women with children to use transi-
tional dwellings.
Comments to the regulations first
proposed by HUD to implement the
new Amendments raised questions
about this exemption. Some urged
HUD to determine what occupancy
standards could be applied to sale or
rental of dwellings, even to the extent
of developing a national occupancy
standard. This HUD declined to do,
interpreting the Amendments to ex-
MAY
press congressional deference to state
and local guidelines. The agency
noted that while HUD promulgated
occupancy standards for use by par-
ticipants in HUD housing programs,
these guidelines may not be reason-
able for other dwellings.
As indicated in HUD's interpreta-
tion of the occupancy standards ex-
emption, the word that will probably
generate litigation in connection with
this exemption is "reasonable."
Occupancy restrictions instituted
by a private owner or manager of
dwellings in the absence of any state
or local occupancy code should be
subject to greater scrutiny. First of all,
there is the question of whether a pri-
vate party can take advantage of the
exemption at all in such a situation.
The statute only mentions "local,
state or federal restrictions" and does
not seem to make provision for an
owner of, for example, a mobile
home park to promulgate occupancy
limits when there are no state or local
restrictions. How the courts answer
this question remains to be seen.
HUD has indicated that, at least as
far as it is concerned, in appropriate
circumstances owners and managers
may develop and implement reason-
able occupancy requirements based
on factors such as number of sleeping
rooms and the overall size of the unit.
HUD goes on to say that it will care-
fully examine such privately promul-
gated restrictions to determine if they
unreasonably exclude families with
children.
HeinOnline  -- 1 Prac. Litig. 48 1990
LITIGATING A FAIR HOUSING CASE 49
You may find guidance on likely ju-
dicial interpretations by reviewing de-
cisions of state courts involving seem-
ingly conflicting provisions of the new
federal Amendments and state laws.
For instance, the California Supreme
Court recently held that the ability of
a mobile home park to bar adults un-
der the age of 25, as allowed by Cali-
fornia law, was not affected by the
Amendments. Schmidt v. Superior
Court of Santa Barbara County 48
Cal. 3d 370, 256 Cal. Rptr. 750, 769
P.2d 932 (1989). Thus, it would seem
that discrimination against persons
over 18 would not be prohibited.
If there is a conflict between the
federal Act and a state law, however,
the Act controls.
Definition of "Dweling"
The definition of "dwelling" is ex-
tremely broad and essentially covers
all housing:
* Apartments or other rental units;
" Single family housing;
" Cooperatives;
" Condominiums; and
" Mobile home parks.
Housing providers should also be
aware that the prohibition against
refusing to rent to families with chil-
dren will almost certainly be inter-
preted to forbid the formerly com-
mon practice of segregating units by
age or family status. The courts have
consistently outlawed the practice of
limiting the number or particular sec-
tions of an apartment complex avail-
able to minorities. See, e.g., United
States v. Starrett City Assoc., 660 F
Supp. 668 (E.D. N.Y. 1987), aff'd,
840 E2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1989); United
States v. Mitchell, 580 E2d 789 (5th
Cir. 1978).
S EGHON 1981 AND 1982 L1TIGAION 0
Two statutes often used in con-
junction with the Act were enacted
soon after the Civil War. One of these
concerned the right of a citizen to own
and control property. That section,
now codified at section 1982, pro-
vides that all citizens shall have the
same right as enjoyed by white citi-
zens to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal
property"
In 1870, Congress passed another
civil rights act to further extend to non-
white citizens the rights of citizenship.
This broader act provided that "all per-
sons. . . have the same right. .,. to
make and enforce contracts . . to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white cit-
ize.. .. " These laws received rela-
tively little attention until the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court decision Jones v.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court
held that section 1982 prohibited both
public and private discrimination in
the sale or rental of property. The
Court further held that the statute was
a valid exercise of congressional power
1990
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under the thirteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
These statutes were used exten-
sively to overcome the limitations of
the Act in the areas of punitive dam-
ages and attorneys' fees. Since the
Amendments and recent case law per-
mit punitive damages and attorneys'
fees these statutes may be of limited
use to plaintiffs.
The Patterson Case
The U.S. Supreme Court in Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 109
S.Ct. 2363 (1989), found that a suit
against an employer claiming racial
harassment did not state a valid claim
under section 1981. The rationale was
that section 1981 did not apply to
post-formation contract situations.
Effect on Lower Court Decisions
It is uncertain what effect, if any,
Patterson may have on lower court
decisions holding that section 1981
furnishes a cause of action for racially
retaliatory evictions of tenants. Jus-
tice Kennedy, who wrote the 5-4 ma-
jority opinion in Patterson, affirmed
the importance of section 1981. "The
law now reflects society's consensus
that discrimination based on the color
of one's skin is a profound wrong of
tragic dimension." Id. at 2379. This
type of language does not support a
narrow interpretation of the law.
It is interesting that the Fourth Cir-
cuit decision in Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 805 E2d 1143, 1145
(4th Cir. 1986), supports a claim un-
MAY
der section 1981 for racially discrimi-
natory discharge. Since the decision in
Patterson there have been decisions
both affirming and denying that sec-
tion 1981 protects employees from ra-
cially discriminatory firings.
Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and
Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 570 (D.C.
Kan. 1989); Booth v. Terminix Inter-
national Inc., 722 E Supp. 675 (D.
Kan. 1989); Padilla v. United Air
Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo.
1989). Cf. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co.,
885 E2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989).
Contra Thompson v. Johnson Mgmt.
Information Center 725 E Supp. 826,
827 (D.N.J. 1989).
Until a Circuit Court or the Su-
preme Court rules on the subject a
claim should still be raised for racially
discriminatory or retaliatory evictions
under section 1981. However, you
should still be aware of the protec-
tions accorded non-white citizens by
section 1982. The language of this
statute differs substantially from that
of section 1981. Further, the rights im-
plicated by section 1982 are not just
contractual, but instead deal with the
right to own, lease, or hold property.
Thus Patterson should have no effect
on it. On this reasoning a racially dis-
criminatory eviction, since it denies
the right to "hold . . . property,"
would arguably still be actionable un-
der section 1982.
Finally, the effect of the Patterson
decision is also limited in fair housing
litigation except when the Act's ex-
emptions might prevent bringing a
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suit. This would occur when the
owner of the property in question is
exempted under section 3603.
f ROVING INTENT a Noticeably ab-
sent from the Amendments is any
indication as to whether a showing of
intent is necessary to prove a violation
of the Act. Under the most common
theory of proving a fair housing viola-
tion, the disparate treatment theory,
the plaintiff will attempt to show that
her treatment by the defendant was
caused by a prohibited motive.
Plaintiffs have successfully used
another theory in a number of fair
housing cases. It is known as the dis-
parate impact or discriminatory ef-
fects theory. Under this theory a
plaintiff may succeed in proving a vi-
olation without proof of discrimina-
tory intent. The underpinning for this
theory is that the Act was meant to
outlaw practices that result in exclud-
ing members of protected classes re-
gardless of the motivation behind the
practice. The use of this theory or
some variant has been upheld consist-
ently by the federal courts of appeals.
See, e.g., Huntington Branch
NAACP v. The Town of Huntington,
844 E2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 109S.
Ct. 276 (1988); Betsey v. Thrtle Creek
Associates, 736 E2d 983 (4th Cir.
1984); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782
E2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986).
The disparate impact or effects the-
ory was adopted from litigation in-
volving employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, §2000e et seq. Because of the
similarity between some of the lan-
guage and, more importantly, the
goals of Title VII and the language
and goals of the Act, the courts have
freely borrowed from Title VII prece-
dent in analyzing fair housing cases.
Schwartz, The Fair Housing Act and
"Discriminatoiy Effecth: A New Per-
spective, 11 Nova L. Rev. 71 (1986).
The Elements of Disparate Impact
Under disparate impact, if a plain-
tiff can present evidence that a policy
has a greater adverse impact on a pro-
tected class of persons or perpetuates
segregation, the defendant must then
prove that the policy is justified by an
important and rational business rea-
son. Betsey v. Tirtle Creek Associates,
736 E2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
Effect of Wards Cove Decision
Since the disparate impact or effects
test is so closely modeled on Title VII
law, the Supreme Court's decision last
term in the case of Ward's Cove v. Ato-
nio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), which
changed the ground rules for Title VII
disparate impact cases, might affect
fair housing disparate impact cases. In
Ward's Cove the Court first held that
plaintiffs attempting to show the dis-
criminatory impact of a hiring policy
must be specific and show what partic-
ular part of the selection procedure ad-
versely affected the plaintiffs. It is no
longer sufficient to simply point to a
disparity in the work force. The court
then went on to hold that once the
1990
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plaintiff does establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact, the defend-
ant must only meet a burden of
production-not proof-of evidence
that the policy in question was justified
by a substantial business reason.
Although the effects of the Ward's
Cove decision on future employment
litigation are difficult to predict, it is
even harder to assess the decision's
likely effect on fair housing cases. The
Court's pronouncement on the speci-
ficity necessary to establish the plain-
tiff's prima facie case will probably
not make a great difference in fair
housing cases since plaintiffs in fair
housing cases can almost always read-
ily identify a specific policy which is
causing a disparate impact. Almost
all disparate impact fair housing cases
concern a single policy which results
in the disparate impact.
In employment cases the question
of whether a justification put forward
by the employer for the discrinmina-
tory policy is adequate may be a close
one. Thus the burden of proof issue
would be crucial to the outcome. In
fair housing cases, however, the justi-
fication offered by a housing provider
for a policy that adversely affects a
protected group is not usually as com-
plex. A clear-cut decision as to the va-
lidity of the justification will be easier
to reach. Thus, whatever the burden
of proof on the housing provider once
the disparate impact is shown, it is not
likely that the litigation strategies of
the parties nor the decision of the
court would vary.
Beware of Rule 11 Sanctions
You must be sensitive to attacks
based on the filing of frivolous law-
suits or pleadings. Fed.R.Civ. P. 11.
The increased willingness of federal
courts to sanction attorneys for filing
pleadings for an improper purpose,
or to cause unnecessary delay or need-
lessly increased litigation costs is now
a serious concern for civil rights law-
yers. Good faith filing is no defense.
In at least one instance, the fact that
HUD had administratively found that
discrimination had occurred was suffi-
cient to deny Rule 11 sanctions. The
court had dismissed the lawsuit and
the successful defendant had requested
$14,000 for the cost of the litigation.
Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883
E2d 587 (7th Cir. 1989). The district
court had found that HUD's investiga-
tion, not vexatious intent, had been the
catalyst to the suit. It therefore refused
to impose sanctions on the plaintiffs or
their counsel.
C ONCLUSION* The Amendments
to the Fair Housing Act offer op-
portunities to promote equal access to
housing for millions of Americans.
Litigators will play an important role
in obtaining the necessary judicial in-
terpretations to translate the objec-
tives of the Act into reality.
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